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Abstract: 
In 2009, Witsenburg and Adano summarized their research on rainfall variability and livestock 
raiding in Marsabit District, Kenya. They found that livestock-related violence was higher in 
wetter months and wetter years, contrary to the common assumption that scarcity of water and 
pasture is the primary driver of livestock violence. Our research, focusing on the neighboring 
Turkana District of northwestern Kenya, attempted to replicate the Witsenburg and Adano 
findings for the years 1998–2009. We find significant relationships between rainfall variability 
and intensity of livestock violence, but in the opposite direction – drier months and drought years 
in Turkana District have higher intensities of violence. 
Keywords: livestock raiding | rainfall variability | Kenya | livestock violence 
Article: 
Introduction 
This article explores possible links between rainfall variability and the intensity of livestock raids 
in and around Turkana District of Kenya, an arid region primarily populated by Turkana herders. 
As in other East African nomadic societies, livestock raids are not a new phenomenon for 
Turkana but the scale and ferocity of such raids has varied over time. To what degree does 
rainfall account for this variability in Turkana District? Our research analyzes empirical data on 
rainfall fluctuation and human casualties from livestock raids for the years 1998–2009.1 One of 
our main purposes is to see if Witsenburg and Adano's findings for Marsabit District, Kenya hold 
true for Turkana District.2 Since our findings are largely in the opposite direction, we end with a 
discussion of why the results may be so different. 
Our attention to rainfall falls broadly within the scope of studies that examine the possible effects 
of resource scarcity on violence. For pastoralists, rainfall appears to be a reasonable proxy for the 
availability of pasture and water – necessary resources for livestock. The time lag for the 
emergence of savanna grasses is relatively short – such grasses sprout quickly with the onset of 
rain and quickly become dormant with the onset of the dry season.3 During prolonged drought, 
pasture and water (except in areas with rivers and deep wells) become much more scarce. 
Ecological theories about violence are not new,4 but increasing attention is being paid now to the 
impact of climate change. Humanitarian agencies and climate change advocates have suggested 
links between recent rise in the scale and ferocity of livestock raids with aspects of climate 
change locally felt in the form of frequent droughts.5 Perhaps for this reason, the Witsenburg and 
Adano findings for Marsabit District were so surprising – they produced evidence supporting the 
opposite view – that in a pastoral region, more rain and presumably more resource abundance 
were associated with more intense violence.6 
While rainfall variability is our focus in this article, we do not presume that intensity of livestock 
raiding can be explained solely by rainfall variability. Indeed, the voluminous literature on cattle 
raids among pastoral communities suggests a combination of cultural,7 economic,8 and 
political9 factors in addition to, and in interaction with, ecological factors. We focus on rainfall 
for heuristic reasons. It is important to see if, and how strongly, rainfall variability (as a proxy for 
pasturage) does predict variation in livestock violence. More complex models can be built to 
incorporate other factors later. 
By what mechanisms would rainfall affect violence? Assuming that scarce rainfall reflects 
resource scarcity for pastoralists, the view of humanitarian agencies and climate change 
advocates is mostly based on an implicitly assumed trigger sequence scenario in which droughts 
lead to the depletion of pastures and water resources. The resulting scarcity, the assumption goes, 
causes competition over resource access which leads to tensions and rivalries among different 
pastoral groups. If not mediated by state intervention and/or local institutions for resource 
sharing and cooperation, the argument continues, this competition will culminate in fighting.10 
This argument mainly addresses unpredictable scarcity such as drought. This scenario is 
consistent with a worldwide cross-cultural study by Carol and Melvin Ember that found that non-
state societies with more unpredictable natural disasters that seriously destroyed food supplies 
were much more likely to have frequent warfare.11 Cross-culturally, when war occurs, it usually 
involves taking land and/or other resources, possibly as a cushion against current and future 
unpredictable events.12 Droughts are one of the most important natural disasters in Kenya. 
Therefore, we would expect to find that yearly rainfall would be negatively related to livestock 
raid violence. 
A somewhat different mechanism is that scarcity causes herders to take more risks, such as 
moving closer to other groups to obtain sufficient pasture. As we discuss more fully in the 
section on the Turkana, extant ethnographic accounts suggest that the pastoral pattern involves 
moving between relatively safe wet season and dry camps during a normal year, with further 
stretching to marginal pastures during drought years. In this pattern, herders who move to 
isolated camps in rarely used drought refugee land are more vulnerable to livestock raids than 
those in the regular camps.13 
An alternative view, proposed by Witsenburg and Adano based on empirical evidence from 
Marsabit District in Kenya, suggests that livestock raids are more violent in wet seasons and 
years when both pasture and water are abundant.14 In this district where an increasingly armed 
population from competing ethnic groups lives side by side (Borana, Gabra, Somali, Dassenetch, 
Burji, Garri, Ajuran, Sakuye, Sidamo, Konso and Waata), Witsenburg and Adano noted that 
when resources dwindled in drought years, people were more inclined to cooperate and use wells 
and pasture together rather than fight.15 Instead, conflict over resources seemed often triggered 
by access problems including the failures of locally working institutions by which resources are 
shared and controlled.16 More importantly, Adano and Witsenburg found that human casualties 
from raids typically peaked in the main rain season (April–June), dropped in the dry season 
(July–September), and increased again when the small rains come (between October and 
December).17 This finding was consistent with interviews with local people who argued that 
raids during the wet season are more fierce, deadly, and violent than the ones during the dry 
season.18 One explanation given for this is the condition of the livestock; they are stronger, 
fatter, and fit for long trek. Other reasons include the availability of vegetation and surface water 
for the animals, and thicker vegetation cover for hiding the attackers.19 These conditions, the 
argument goes, together with the availability of more young men to engage in raiding, provide 
good opportunity for organizing and executing successful livestock raids. 
After briefly reviewing Turkana District and Turkana pastoralist practices, we ask the following 
questions for the years 1998–2009: Does monthly rain and yearly rain predict livestock-related 
violence in Turkana District? Are the patterns consistent with those found by Witsenburg and 
Adano for Marsabit District? That is, do wetter months and wetter years have more livestock-
related violence or do drier months and years have more violence? In addition, we ask whether 
rainfall unpredictability is related to more livestock-related violence. This interest comes from 
the cross-cultural study discussed above; that study also found that chronic scarcity (constant 
hunger or seasonal scarcity) had no independent effect on warfare frequency.20 From the point 
of view of pastoral people with rainy and dry seasons, monthly rainfall is largely predictable – 
they know which months are wetter and which months are drier. Yearly variability, on the other 
hand, is largely unpredictable – the weather can be drier or wetter than normal, but not usually in 
a predictable pattern. But there is another kind of rainfall unpredictability we can look at. A 
particular month in a particular year can be much drier or much wetter than it is supposed to be. 
Does that kind of unpredictability predict more livestock-related violence?21 Finally, although 
we would have liked to test the idea that the presence of assault rifles was associated with more 
violence, almost all of raids we reviewed in our time period had some assault weapons, or the 
newspaper reports only said ‘guns’ without specifying which kind of gun, so we did not have 
enough reliable variability for testing.22 
Turkana Background 
The Turkana are Nilotic people, closely related to the Iteso, Karamojong, Dodoth, Ngijie, 
Taposa, Jiye, and Donyiro. Turkanaland corresponds closely to the boundaries of Turkana 
District in Kenya which lies between 1°30′ and 5°00′ North (see the inset to Figure 1). Although 
many ethnic groups in eastern Africa raise domesticated herd animals, most groups are mixed 
agro-pastoralists living in settled hamlets, neighborhoods, or villages. The Turkana, together 
with certain Somali, Afar, and Gabra communities,23 are one of the few pastoral groups 
currently pursuing a primarily nomadic life in eastern Africa.24 They live in one of the driest 
districts of Kenya, raising five species of livestock (i.e., camels, cattle, sheep, goats, and 
donkeys). Rainfall in the district from 1998 to 2009, our study focus, only averaged 372 mm a 
year. The general pattern of rainfall is bimodal with a relatively longer rainy season starting 
sometime in March through May, and a shorter and somewhat less rainy season in October and 
November. Higher elevation areas receive relatively more rains than lower areas. As a 
consequence, there are two rainfall gradients across the district: a strong south-to-north gradient 
and a weak west-to-east gradient;25 the south and west are generally wetter. 
 
Figure 1 Turkana Livestock-Related Violence, 1998–2009 
The spatial and seasonal variation in rainfall gives rise to uneven pasture and water availability 
over space and time. To an extent, as some ecologists noted, a key aspect of Turkana nomadic 
pastoralism involves opportunistic movements over a fairly wide space pursuing pasture and 
water.26 But ethnographic accounts show that this opportunistic movement takes place within 
broader patterns of established social relations and effective land use strategies.27 The broad 
strategy involves seasonally moving from areas of low productivity in the wet season to more 
productive rangelands during the dry season. For Turkana, the wet season pastures consist of 
large expanses of low-lying plains located at the center of the district. Their annual nomadic 
movement typically begins from this location where relative abundance of fresh grass during 
rainy months allows for larger camps and the corralling of all the animals of related herd owners. 
Over the ensuing nine or so drier months, the herd is taken to high elevation areas, typically 
either to the southwest or northeast, with the highest plant biomasses. With the onset of the 
expected long rains beginning in March, the herd will once again return to the main camp on the 
plains. 
But what about drought years? In times of severe droughts, ethnographers report that the herd 
will be taken further away from regular dry season rangelands to satellite camps on rarely used 
isolated plateaus and remote valleys. These drought refuge areas are often located along borders 
and historically contested areas, thus causing fundamental livelihood dilemmas for herd owners. 
As McCabe noted in his chronicles of four Turkana herders over a 16-year period in 1980–96, 
access to these valuable sites greatly enhanced the odds of herd survival. Yet this move also 
increased the vulnerability of herders and their families to raiding and violence. As a 
consequence, the changing fortunes of the four herders and their families greatly depended on 
how each of them ensured his herd survival by accessing these sites while managing security 
risks. Herders using more daring moves toward rarely used drought reserves minimized their 
herd loss due to drought but encountered frequent attacks by well-armed Pokot raiders. By 
contrast, those who stayed within boundaries of dry season rangelands faced fewer raids but lost 
part of their herd due to drought and/or stress-related livestock diseases.28 
The occurrence of livestock raids and counter-raids with neighboring groups, notably the Pokot, 
is not a new phenomenon in southern Turkana. It has a long history extending back to the 
1880s,29 and it is discussed in major works on both Turkana and Pokot.30 But, with the 
adoption of automatic Kalashnikovs (AK-47s) beginning in the mid-1970s, studies show that the 
frequency and intensity of raids have grown considerably to become ‘the single greatest risk to 
the persistence of nomadic pastoralism and the continued survival of pastoralists themselves’.31 
The availability of these weapons is believed to have transformed livestock raids from small-
scale opportunistic attacks, often with spears and/or outdated rifles, to highly organized assaults 
with devastating casualties often undertaken by what now can be considered professional 
rustlers. 
In the late 1970s, the government of Kenya disarmed the southern Turkana, shifting the balance 
of power in the region in favor of the well-armed Pokot.32 Over the ensuing several years, the 
Turkana suffered massive casualties from Pokot raids. Between 1992 and 1999 alone, for 
example, the Pokot reportedly carried out 14 large-scale ‘AK-47 raids’ in critical dry-season 
grazing areas in South Turkana.33 Estimates of human casualties included over 10,000 Turkana 
deaths from raids undertaken in the years 1991–94 alone.34 The raids had also reportedly 
decimated Turkana herds. The four herding families chronicled by the South Turkana Ecosystem 
Project research had, for example, lost 15 per cent of their total livestock in the second year of 
the drought in 1979–81, and another 35 per cent of the remaining total during the first year of 
their subsequent recovery.35 
One of the Turkana responses to minimizing risks of raids has been to reduce their degree of 
vulnerability to potential raiders by shortening the time of stay in one place. This entails 
increasing the frequency of moves. In McCabe's report for the 1980s, for example, the herders 
moved their main camp on average 15 times per year, and the percentage of moves attributes to 
fear of attacks by Pokot and other raiders accounted for over 20 percent of their total moves. By 
1998, however, the threat had become very serious to such a degree that the average number of 
camp moves per year by herders interviewed by Pike was 24, and all of them were in response to 
fear of raids.36 
A second response to increasing risk of raids was the emergence of a defensive social 
organization called Arum-Rum. According to McCabe, this new organization consisted of about 
50 or more families, which previously migrated in small independent groups, living together 
within three concentric rings of fences under the leadership of a single leader.37 In this system, 
which was apparently adopted from the Karimonjong,38 livestock stayed in the tightly secured 
inner fence, while the people lived in the second. Armed men guarded both people and livestock 
from positions on the third fence. 
While this fear-induced clustering of many people and livestock in one place may have provided 
the Turkana with a temporary sense of security, it created a dilemma regarding decision-making. 
The group had to move more frequently than individual households as localized resources were 
exhausted quickly due to the high concentration of livestock. Yet, the arrangement required all 
herding units to coordinate their moves if they wanted to remain within the group. 
The ethnographic reports of Turkana researchers suggest that livestock-related violence would be 
expected to be higher in drier times (both drought years and drier months) because that is when 
the Turkana have to move further from their wet-season camps and closer to other ethnic groups. 
However, this is not what the data from Witsenburg and Adano suggest. Their data from 
Marsabit suggest that most livestock-related violence occurs in wet months and wetter years.39 
Our purpose is to systematically test the Witsenburg and Adano hypotheses – and the alternatives 
from the ethnographic literature on the Turkana – with data relevant to Turkana District. In other 
words, we test the hypotheses that: (1) monthly rainfall variability will be related to livestock-
raid violence; and (2) yearly rainfall variability will be related to livestock-raid violence. As 
discussed above, we also tested an additional hypothesis dealing with unpredictability – namely, 
that livestock-related violence will be greater if a particular month/year combination departs 
considerably from an average month. Because different directions have been suggested, we use 
two-tailed tests in our analyses. 
Methods 
Livestock-Related Violence 
Our reports of violence come from media and news reports about Turkana that appeared in the 
LexisNexis online database (accessed from the summer of 2009 through November 2010) 
reporting on news from 1998 to 2009.40 Research assistants looked at all articles in LexisNexis 
for media and news reports containing the variant names Turkana or Turcana (the actual search 
was Tur*ana) for each year beginning with 1998 and ending in 2009. Approximately 500 articles 
were found per year.41 Each article was read to assess whether it referred to Turkana people 
(sometimes Lake Turkana was referred to) and whether it reported any violence, raids, or 
attempted violence. The assistants were allowed to disregard any article that was clearly not 
referring to Turkana people or was very far away from Turkana District (for example, the article 
referred to a Turkana person or a group in Nairobi). However, they were instructed to download 
the article if they thought it was relevant or were unsure of the relevance. A database was 
designed to have a record for each violent incident, rather than by article, because sometimes 
more than one incident were reported in an article. For example, an article could report on 
several attacks over a few days in different villages, or an attack followed by a counterattack a 
day or two later. Note that immediate or short-term defense tactics such as gathering some help 
to try to retrieve stolen animals within hours of an initial attack was not counted as a separate 
incident, but counter-attacks a day later were included. We focus explicitly on livestock-related 
violence here, as Witsenburg and Adano did.42 In our research, all of the following needed to be 
present to count as livestock-related violence involving Turkana: (1) raids were socially 
organized at least on one side; (2) the violence involved Turkana as attackers or attacked in or 
bordering Turkana District; and (3) the incident involved attempts or actual theft of livestock, 
involved disputes over access to water or pasture for livestock, or were stated to be retributions 
for previous livestock raids. All livestock-related incidents were tagged as such in the database. 
Other information recorded from the news reports included the news source and byline, headline, 
author, date and place of conflict, ethnicity of attacking party and of attacked party, number of 
people reported killed in the incident, number of people reported wounded, reported atrocities, 
property destroyed or stolen, number and type of livestock taken, weapons used, and purported 
reasons for conflict. 
Because the LexisNexis database includes hundreds of news sources, duplicate accounts of 
incidents were commonplace and had to be culled from our database. The assistants made the 
first round of decisions regarding what were duplicate reports of the same incidents on the basis 
of the identities of parties involved in the incident and the place and date of the incident. 
However, reports might vary in the information given about a particular incident; some reports 
might only identify one party, or be less specific of the location of the incident, identifying a 
district rather than a county, or town. Also information on the number of casualties and livestock 
stolen might vary. Initial reports might not be as complete as later accounts that verified total 
deaths and stolen livestock. Wounded might turn into deaths. Assistants made preliminary 
indications about possible duplicates and suggested which article to use. The authors reviewed 
cases where it was unclear whether there were duplicates, and cases in which it was not easy to 
decide which article to use. Articles with more information and more detailed information were 
typically used, although in some cases more than one article were used because each provided 
different information (e.g., one might have number of deaths, other might have specific number 
of livestock stolen). If there were multiple figures on casualties, we usually averaged them, 
except when one figure appeared to be a serious outlier. Figure 1 shows the locations of the 149 
incidents of livestock-related violence involving Turkana that form the basis of our study. The 
administrative units (locations in Kenya; counties in Uganda) with more incidents have darker 
shading. 
Our primary measure of livestock-related violence is the number of reported human deaths 
during livestock-related raids. The number of casualties was the most widely reported statistic in 
the news media next to incident reports. We focus on reported deaths rather than the number of 
incidents for three reasons. First, media and news reports only reported violence involving more 
than one ethnic group, suggesting a bias in reporting toward inter-ethnic conflict and away from 
intra-ethnic conflict. We know from ethnographic reports that the Turkana engage in some intra-
ethnic livestock raiding. Since no intra-ethnic raids were reported during the 12-year period, we 
are concerned that a lack of an incident in a particular month and year does not necessarily mean 
that no livestock raid occurred during that time frame. Second, we suspect that the media will 
pick up the more spectacular incidents and underreport the minor incidents.43 Third, Witsenburg 
and Adano did not find any results with the number of incidents reported, so we did not think 
that such a line of analysis would be productive. 
For the reasons stated above, in all the analyses involving number of deaths in livestock-related 
violence, we only consider mortality numbers for reported incidents. In other words, we did not 
consider a month with no reported incidents a ‘zero’ on casualties; rather we counted it as 
missing information. A ‘zero’ only occurs if an incident was reported, but there were no reported 
deaths. This approach has the effect analytically of focusing on degree of violence rather than 
incidence of violence, which is in line with our usage of number of deaths. 
Because our rainfall data were only available by the month, we aggregated the number of 
reported deaths during livestock-related raids involving Turkana (as attackers or as attacked) for 
each month as well. Further sums or averages were computed to match rainfall analyses (e.g., 
sum of deaths per year, average deaths for January, and average monthly deaths per dry month) – 
see below. We used a secondary measure of livestock-raid violence – the average number of 
deaths per raid by particular month and by particular years. 
Examples of Raids 
To illustrate the type of raids we are talking about, we give two examples. The first is one of the 
largest in terms of the number of animals stolen (although this number could be exaggerated), 
and had above average casualties (11 is the average number of casualties per raid). The second is 
smaller in scale with a below-average number of casualties. 
1. In April 2008, hundreds of Turkana and Samburu raiders stole approximately 20,000 animals 
from two locations in the Chalbi desert region of Marsabit District. About 1,500 animals were 
recovered relatively immediately when a posse of locals and police caught up with the raiders 
and continued with intense fighting. In the attack by the Turkana and Samburu, 14 people died, 
including a child and a police reservist. The attack supposedly occurred in retaliation to two prior 
raids by local herders on Turkana and/or Samburu.44 
2. In January 2002, more than 150 raiders from West Pokot took over 500 animals from the 
Turkana in a border area where the Kenyan Army had been keeping the peace but recently had 
withdrawn. Four people, including one raider, died in the attack. Security personnel pursued the 
raiders but were not able to recover any animals because the terrain was rugged and hilly.45 
Measures of Rainfall 
We chose the starting date of 1998 because that was the first date we could get precise measures 
of rainfall constructed from meteorological data on 0.25 square degree (approximately 30 square 
kilometers) quadrants by month and year for the entire Turkana District. Our data were collected 
from 2010 to 2011, so our end date was 2009, a 12-year period from 1998 to 2009. These rainfall 
data were obtained from the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) 3B43.46 Our 
collaborators from a larger project on agent-based modeling of violence in eastern Africa from 
George Mason University used ArcGIS to convert the hierarchical data format, which is not 
directly importable by ArcGIS, into ASCII files. MATLAB was used to create a 
multidimensional array from which the data on a rough rectangle around Turkana District were 
abstracted and put into Excel files. After overlaying an administrative map of Turkana District 
on top of the rectangular parcel grid, we excluded all parcels outside Turkana District for the 
purposes of computing rainfall. There were a total of 108 quadrants. The advantage of this 
weather dataset is that it does not need to take one or a few weather stations as proxies for the 
whole district.47 Rather, the rainfall data per month and year are aggregated from all the parcels 
that comprise the administrative Turkana District into a specific monthly or yearly average for 
the whole district. We would have liked to have rainfall information for the specific area where 
raiders came from. However, newspaper reports usually do not state the location of the raiders' 
homeland except in the most general terms (i.e., ethnicity) – they usually state the location of 
those raided. We use the aggregated rainfall for Turkana District as if people in that general 
region are generally experiencing divergence in rainfall in the same direction and degree from 
normal. Yearly rainfall for Turkana District (e.g., 1998 and 1999) was an average of yearly 
rainfall for all of the 108 quadrants. Averages were computed for each month (January, 
February, etc.) across the 12 years and the 108 quadrants. 
We also evaluate the unpredictability of each particular month's rainfall (e.g., January 1998) by 
calculating a z-score for that month/year based on the average for that month across the years 
(e.g., January) and the standard deviation for that month across years. As before, the particular 
month/year rainfall amounts are averages across all the quadrants. We take the average rainfall 
for the month/year combination (e.g., January 1998) and subtract the overall average for that 
month (e.g., January) across the 12 years and divide it by the standard deviation of monthly 
rainfall for that month. If the particular month/year is close to normal for the month, it is 
assumed to be predictable; if it is far from normal, it is unpredictable. However, it can be 
unpredictable in one of two directions – drier than normal for the month or wetter than normal. 
Results 
Monthly Rainfall 
Figure 2 shows the average rainfall in Turkanaland by month computed from 1998 to 2009. As is 
apparent from the graph, there is a bimodal rainfall pattern with the highest rainfall in April and 
May (locally called the ‘long rains’) and the next highest peak is in October and November (the 
‘short rains’). On the basis of ethnographic report, the long rains in some areas begin sometime 
in March with an early part of the month being very dry and the later part of the month very 
wet.48 
 
Figure 2 Average Rainfall in Turkanaland by Months (1998–2009). 
Figure 3 shows the average number of deaths in livestock-related deaths per month. Just 
eyeballing the graph shows that three of the four rainiest months (May, October, and November) 
have the lowest mean number of livestock-related deaths. February, the driest month, has the 
highest number of deaths per month. If we look at livestock raid intensity judging by the average 
number of deaths per raid, Figure 4 shows a similar pattern. 
 
Figure 3 Average Monthly Deaths in Turkanaland due to Livestock Raids (1998–2009). 
 
Figure 4 Average Deaths Per Raid (Livestock-Related) by Month (1998–2009). 
 
Witsenburg and Adano had suggested that some restocking was done just before the heaviest 
rains.49 Accordingly we grouped months by the following types: dry months, months before the 
rains (March and September), short rains (October and November), and the long rains (April and 
May). Figure 5 shows that the rainy seasons have the lowest average number of monthly deaths 
in livestock raids. The month before the rains is almost as high as the dry months on average, so 
there might be some merit to Witsenburg and Adano's suggestion of restocking during that time. 
Unfortunately, we do not know when the rains start in March, so it is difficult to evaluate 
whether raiding is largely taking place during the dry or wet part of March. If we divide March 
into three parts, the number of deaths in livestock raids is somewhat bimodal. There are 83 total 
deaths in the beginning of March across the 12 years, which is probably dry, 71 in the last third 
of March, which is probably wet, and 33 deaths in the middle. This may give some support to the 
restocking thesis. 
 
Figure 5 Association of Average Monthly Deaths (Livestock-Related) with Seasonality of 
Rainfall (1998–2009). 
 
Rather than looking at the months ordered by yearly calendar, Figure 6 shows the months 
ordered by their category of standard deviation away from average monthly rainfall. In general, 
the months with below normal rainfall have the highest number of mean monthly deaths. 
 
Figure 6 Association of Average Monthly Deaths (Livestock-Related) with Standard Deviation 
in Monthly Rainfall (1998–2009). 
Are these trends statistically significant? For each month, we computed the average rainfall 
across the 12 years and correlated it with the average number of livestock-related deaths for that 
month. The correlation is moderately strong (r = − .58), and significant (n = 12; p < 0.047, two 
tails). Note that the direction of the relationship is opposite to the direction found by Witsenburg 
and Adano.50 The less the rain per month, the higher the deaths in livestock-related violence. 
Yearly Rainfall 
Are wetter years more likely to have more livestock-related deaths in Turkana District as 
Witsenburg and Adano suggested for Marsabit District? The short answer is no. 
Figure 7 shows the total rainfall in Turkanaland by year from 1998 to 2009. The average yearly 
rainfall is only 372 mm. However, the year 2000 was extraordinarily dry with only 167 mm of 
rainfall. As can be seen in Figure 8, the year 2000 was also by far the highest year of livestock 
raid casualties with 367 reported. Of the next three years with relatively dry weather (2009, 
1999, and 2008), two (2008 and 1999) had the second- and third-most casualties (164 and 136, 
respectively). The year 2009, the second driest year, looks anomalous with relatively low 
casualties, which we cannot explain. The year 2006 also looks somewhat anomalous with high 
livestock violence in spite of being the wettest year during the time frame. However, much of the 
violence in 2006 may have to do with events leading to the 2007 election. This election not only 
resulted in widespread ethnic conflict, but also involved redrawing of district boundaries in both 
Turkana and Baringo (later called East and West Pokot). 
 
Figure 7 Total Rainfall in Turkanaland by Year (1998–2009). 
 
Figure 8 Total Yearly Deaths in Turkanaland Due to Livestock Raids (1998–2009). 
 
The correlation between total rainfall per year and the number of livestock-related deaths is 
moderately strong and significant (n = 12; r = − .61, p < 0.035, two tails). The graph in Figure 9 
shows the average number of yearly deaths by years ordered by number of standard deviations 
from a normal year. The relationship is not quite linear, but the two highest categories – where 
the yearly rainfall is more than 0.5 standard deviations below average – have the highest mean 
number of deaths. Once rainfall is normal, the curve flattens out. 
 
Figure 9 Association of Average Yearly Deaths (Livestock-Related) with Standard Deviation in 
Yearly Rainfall (1998–2009). 
If we look at just raids where the Turkana are the attackers (Figure 10), the year 2009 does not 
look anomalous. It is the second driest year and has the third highest peak in casualties. The 
driest year, 2000, still has the highest peak in casualties. The fourth driest year, 2008, has the 
second highest number of casualties. Now 1999, the third driest year, with low casualties, looks 
anomalous. The year 2007 with above-average rainfall also looks anomalous with the fourth 
highest number of casualties. As discussed above, this might be related to the election crisis of 
2007. 
 
Figure 10 Total Yearly Deaths in Turkanaland Due to Livestock Raids (1998–2009). 
Month and Year Combined 
Pastoralists know the weather well, so a dry month or season is to be expected. But what if a 
month is much drier than expected or is much wetter than expected? Does this kind of 
unpredictability predict the degree of livestock-related violence? 
Figure 11 shows the grouping of particular month/years combinations into number of standard 
deviations away from a normal month (e.g., January 2000 compared to all Januaries). When we 
compute the number of deaths in livestock-related violence for particular month/year 
combinations, we only use 74 month/year combinations with at least one reported livestock-
related incident.51 Although the relationship is not linear, deaths seem the highest where a 
particular month in a particular year is 0.5–0.99 standard deviations drier than a normal month; 
the next highest category is when the month is one or more standard deviations below normal. If 
we group the first two categories into more than 0.5 standard deviations below normal versus the 
other three, the correlation with number of deaths per month is − .31 (n = 74, p < 0.007, two 
tails). The pattern looks more linear if we just look at raids where the Turkana are attackers (see 
Figure 12). Using the five standard deviation categories for each month/year and the number of 
livestock-related deaths, the size of the sample is only 31 and the correlation (r = − .26, p < 0.07, 
two tails) is marginally significant. Contrast the situation looking just at raids where the Turkana 
are attacked by others. Figure 13 looks slightly bimodal, with the least deadly livestock-raid 
violence when rainfall is approximately average.52 These last two graphs (Figures 12 and 13) 
suggest that the Turkana and their attackers are following somewhat different strategies. 
 
Figure 11 Looking at Deaths in Livestock Raids and Deviation of Each Month from Normal 
Across Years (1998–2009). 
 
 
Figure 12 Looking at Deaths in Livestock Raids and Deviation of Each Month From Normal 
Across Years (1998–2009). 
 
Figure 13 Looking At Deaths in Livestock Raids and Deviation of Each Month From Normal 
Across Years (1998–2009) 
Discussion 
Across all the analyses of rainfall and livestock-related violence, the results for Turkana District 
show a clear and consistent pattern – the most intense livestock violence occurs when rain is less 
than normal for a typical month, a typical year, and a particular month/year combination. These 
patterns are opposite to those suggested by Witsenburg and Adano for Marsabit.53 But these 
data are consistent with what we know from the ethnography of the Turkana. The Turkana are 
Nilotic people who adapted to the harshest environment of the central Rift Valley, using mobility 
strategies to cope with dry conditions. Central Turkana country is very dry, but it is suitable for 
pasturing more animals and more people during the wet season. As described above, when the 
pasture is disappearing, the Turkana head for wetter areas. If necessary, the herds are divided by 
type of livestock with different groups of men going with different types of animals. In the driest 
months, the Turkana are furthest from base camps. But in drought years, they must go even 
further away to wetter areas close to the territory of other ethnic groups. These lands are more 
desirable as drought reserves, but they are also more dangerous. The herding groups are also 
small, making the group more vulnerable to attack. The ethnographic description of mobility 
patterns may help explain why there is more violence from attacks during dry months, drought 
years, and when month/year combinations are drier than normal. But it is only part of the picture 
because the Turkana are not just attacked. They are also attackers, and the attacks by Turkana on 
other groups fit the patterns we have found even more strongly. For example, a comparison of 
Figures 12 and 13 suggests that Turkana attacking violence during livestock-related attacks are 
linearly related to drier than normal conditions, but the pattern is less linear when the Turkana 
are attacked (as we suggested above, others may be following somewhat different strategies). 
Why should the Turkana attack in drier conditions? Here our reasoning is speculative since we 
do not have interviews with Turkana individuals, but if pasture and water are scarce and access 
cannot be arranged peacefully during dry times, there may be little choice but to aggressively 
fight for access even if the attacking groups are small. In addition, livestock theft may make up 
for the loss of livestock lost in drought conditions or livestock theft of animals grazing in wetter 
conditions cushions against future losses. Thus, we suggest that a combination of mobility 
strategies (moving to riskier places during dry times inviting more attack) and scarcity (attacking 
to gain access to pasture and making up for animals losses) may account for the Turkana 
patterns. 
In addition, we have raised the question whether unpredictability of rainfall is related to more 
livestock violence. We use extreme yearly rainfall variability as a kind of unpredictability. 
Droughts and floods are not predictable and may seriously destroy food supplies. We have also 
looked at the degree to which a particular month/year departs from what a normal month should 
be. With regard to data from Turkana District from 1998 to 2009, drought years do have more 
livestock-related violence, as do months that are much drier than expected. But for the Turkana, 
unpredictability seems only important in one direction – drier than normal, but not wetter than 
normal, is related to more violence. Why? We have to remember that the Turkana area is 
generally very dry, so drier than expected can produce severe scarcity. While some flooding has 
occurred, wetter than normal is probably much less of a problem than drought. But while results 
regarding unpredictability are supported, we have to wonder whether it is unpredictability that is 
important for Turkana District or simply drier than normal conditions. For in all tests of the 
hypotheses, both predictable and unpredictable dryness predict more violence. 
Do these rainfall patterns fit other groups? We intend to explore this question by examining data 
from other districts, starting with the two Pokot-inhabited districts of Kenya. Our preliminary 
analyses looking just at the attackers of the Turkana (mostly Pokot, but not differentiated here) 
suggest that the attackers are largely following the Turkana pattern of attacking more in dry 
months and dry years, but there are suggestions that the pattern is probably not as strong for 
those attacking the Turkana as for the Turkana as attackers. The more critical question, which 
remains to be investigated moving forward is why results for Turkana differ so much from 
Marsabit District. It is possible that some methodological differences between our study and the 
Witsenburg and Adano study could account for some of the differences. First, we have looked at 
a later time frame; their study, which covers the years 1913–99 (with 28 analyzable years) only 
overlaps with our first two years (1998–99). Conceivably rainfall has become more erratic and 
we are seeing a different pattern in the later time frame. Second, although we cannot imagine 
how it would affect results, the Marsabit study used rainfall from only one place as a proxy for 
rainfall in the entire district, whereas our data come from the entire Turkana district. Third, the 
Marsabit study did not disaggregate ethnic groups; it is possible that different ethnic groups have 
different patterns. On more theoretical grounds, we have two theories we intend to try to test. 
The first relates to the difference in subsistence in the two districts. While it is true that ethnic 
groups in both areas rely on herding animals, most of the Marsabit ethnic groups (except for the 
Gabra) are more dependent on agriculture than the Turkana. While rainy seasons usually provide 
more pasture for animals and therefore have more resource abundance in pasture, the rainy 
season may be scarce in food supply as crops are just being planted and stored food may have 
run out. Thus, ‘rain’ does not necessarily mean generally abundant resources for mixed agro-
pastoralists. The second theory is that mobility strategies are the underlying issue, not rainfall. 
The Turkana traditionally break into smaller groups and move herds farther to different pasture 
area in drier times. As we discussed earlier, these other pastures are in riskier places closer to 
other ethnic groups. In contrast, some of the Marsabit groups depend on cooperating with other 
ethnic groups in dry times. For example, the Gabra have no rivers, and to survive during dry 
times provide labor for the Borana in exchange for access to their deep wells.54 The need for 
cooperation may mitigate against fighting in those times. If this latter idea is correct, we would 
not expect a simple relationship between rainfall and violence, but rather an interaction that 
varies with mobility strategy. 
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